Satellites and Municipalities:  One Town’s Use of Google Earth for Residential Surveillance by Knoedler, Edward
Touro Law Review 
Volume 28 Number 2 Article 6 
July 2012 
Satellites and Municipalities: One Town’s Use of Google Earth for 
Residential Surveillance 
Edward Knoedler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Knoedler, Edward (2012) "Satellites and Municipalities: One Town’s Use of Google Earth for Residential 
Surveillance," Touro Law Review: Vol. 28 : No. 2 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss2/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For 




SATELLITES AND MUNICIPALITIES: ONE TOWN’S USE OF 





An August 1, 2010 article that ran in Newsday, a Long Island 
based newspaper, created a firestorm of controversy when it told the 
story of a municipality, the Town of Riverhead, utilizing Google 
Earth to nab code violators.1  This article was picked up by major 
news databases and publications across the nation, sparked debates 
on Good Morning America as well as Fox News with Sean Hannity, 
and outraged civil libertarians who believe that the use of satellite 
imaging by the government is another step towards an Orwellian 
―Big Brother‖ society.2  As a result of the national attention, the mu-
nicipality eventually ended its program.3  Shortly thereafter, the 
Town Board of Riverhead passed a resolution and adopted a policy 
concerning the use of satellite imaging services, such as the internet 
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, May 2012; B.S., 
St. Lawrence University, 2000.  I would like to express my gratitude to my family and 
friends for their love and support throughout my law school career. 
1 Mitchell Freedman & Will Van Sant, Riverhead Tracks Pools with Google, NEWSDAY, 
Aug. 1, 2010, at A6, available at 2010 WLNR 15272293 (explaining that the Town of 
Riverhead‘s Chief Building Inspector utilized Google Earth to ―eyeball[] properties . . . and 
identified those with pools, then compared the list to records of homes with pool permits.‖).  
The Town was able to catch approximately 250 homeowners who had swimming pools 
without the proper permits.  Id. 
2 See Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast Aug. 23, 2010), transcript 
available at 2010 WLNR 16836740; Hannity Dismisses Patriot Act Concerns, Obsesses 
About People Seeing Him In A Speedo Via Google Earth, NEWSHOUNDS.US (Aug. 7, 2010), 
http://www.newshounds.us/2010/08/07/hannity_dismisses_patriot_act_concerns_obsesses_a
bout_people_seeing_him_in_a_speedo_via_google_earth.php. 
3 See All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast Sept. 10, 2010), transcript 
available at 2010 WLNR 18048428 (interviewing the Town of Riverhead‘s chief building 
inspector and stating ―[t]he town of Riverhead has voted to stop using Google Earth satellite 
images to find backyard pools that don‘t have proper permits‖). 
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application called Google Earth, prohibiting the use of satellite imag-
ing for prosecutorial purposes.4 
This Comment will address the legal issues and ramifications 
of using satellite imaging, specifically, Google Earth, by a municipal-
ity on its citizens.  This first section will give the reader a brief over-
view of the structure of the paper as well as an introduction to the is-
sues being broached by this comment.  Section II will address the 
history behind the web based satellite imaging product known as 
Google Earth.  Additionally, it will explore the ever broadening uses 
and applications of satellite imaging in today‘s society and provide an 
example of a municipality utilizing Google Earth. 
Section III will discuss, what is in all probability, the most 
significant issue surrounding the use of satellite technology by a mu-
nicipality on its citizens.  The issue is whether the use of this technol-
ogy is an infringement of an individual‘s constitutional rights as set 
forth in the Fourth Amendment.5  The section will give a brief over-
view of the history of the Fourth Amendment and its adaptation 
through the years as science has progressed.  This Comment tries to 
tackle the issue of whether the use of such technology without proba-
ble cause would constitute an unreasonable search.  Section IV will 
address the doctrines of ―Open Field‖ and ―Curtilage‖ and how they 
play a role in determining what constitutes an invasion of privacy.  
Additionally, two recent cases, Dow Chemical Company v. United 
States6 and California v. Ciraolo,7 and their subsequent effect on the 
issue at hand will be discussed.  Section V will discuss the characte-
ristics of a municipality, the extent of a municipality‘s power to regu-
late its citizens and the scope of municipal liability.  It will be ex-
plained that liability hinges upon whether a municipality owes a duty 
to its citizens to use every legal means at its disposal to ensure a safe 
environment.  If this rings true, then not utilizing Google Earth could 
be deemed negligence on the municipality‘s behalf. 
This Comment will conclude that while the present use of 
 
4 Riverhead, N.Y., Res. 709 (2010), available at http://www.riverheadli.com/TBM.09. 
08.10.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (guaranteeing ―[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized‖). 
6 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
7 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) [hereinafter Ciraolo I]. 
2
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Google Earth by a municipality to regulate its‘ citizens may not be a 
popular policy, it is not overly intrusive and not a violation of any 
constitutional right. 
II. GOOGLE EARTH: SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY & ITS 
BROADENING SCOPE OF USE 
A. A Brief History of Google Earth 
Initially, satellite imagery was exclusively available and uti-
lized by the military and related government agencies.8  However, 
over the past several years, there have been major technological ad-
vances with regard to satellite based technology.  Due to these ad-
vancements, the technology has become affordable and available to 
the general public.9  As a result, global positioning devices are now 
commonplace among consumers and aerial imagery has been re-
placed by satellite imagery.  Satellite images are now available on-
line, in most instances free of charge, and can be viewed by the pub-
lic on such websites as Yahoo, Bing, and Google.10  These websites 
utilize this tool as a way to draw traffic to their respective domains, 
with the larger websites providing the most detailed and up-to-date 
images. 
Google, since its inception, has risen to become the world‘s 
largest search engine.11  In the United States alone, Google sites 
 
8 Brian Craig, Online Satellite and Aerial Images: Issues and Analysis, 83 N.D. L. REV 
547, 549 (2007) (stating that Google Earth ―started in the intelligence community, in a CIA-
backed firm called Keyhole that Google acquired in 2004‖). 
9 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (―Technological progress 
poses a threat to privacy by enabling an extent of surveillance that in earlier times would 
have been prohibitively expensive.  Whether and what kind of restrictions should, in the 
name of the Constitution, be placed on such surveillance when used in routine . . . 
enforcement are momentous issues . . . .‖). 
10 See YAHOO, http://maps.yahoo.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2010); BING, 
http://www.bing.com/Maps (last visited Nov. 12, 2010); GOOGLE, http://maps.google.com 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
11 Press Release – comScore reports global search market growth of 46 percent in 2009, 
COMSCORE.COM, http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2010/1/Global_ 
Search_Market_Grows_46_Percent_in_2009 (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (―Google Sites 
ranked as the top search property worldwide with . . . 66.8 percent of the global search 
market.‖). 
3
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owned a 65.4% market share of searches conducted.12  As the com-
pany grew and technology expanded, new applications were added to 
its inventory.  In February 2005, Google Maps went live, and by 
April this service provided satellite views.13  A more advanced ver-
sion of Google Maps soon followed, aptly named Google Earth.14 
Google Earth is ―a satellite imagery-based mapping service 
combining 3D buildings and terrain with mapping capabilities and 
Google search.‖15  The basic version is a free service that requires on-
ly a download of the application and is widely utilized by the public 
with an estimated 200 million users.16  An advanced version of 
Google Earth, Google Earth Pro, can be purchased for a $399 annual 
subscription.17  However, both versions utilize the same image data-
base with most images being an aerial view about 800-1,500 feet 
above ground.18  The visual imagery in Google Earth is updated on a 
rolling basis, not in real time, with new additions monthly, and typi-
cally one to three years old.19  Google Maps and its progeny are con-
sidered the ―most popular source of web-based free satellite im-
ages.‖20 
A new add-on to Google Maps and Google Earth is called 
Street View.  Street View, which launched in April 2008, depicts pa-
noramic images along roadways and in public places.21  Google uti-
lizes cars equipped with cameras that take pictures as they drive 
 
12 Press Release – comScore releases August 2010 US search engine rankings, 
COMSCORE.COM, http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2010/9/comScore 
_Releases_August_2010_U.S._Search_Engine_Rankings (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 
13 Corporate Information: Google Milestones, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ 
corporate/history.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Craig, supra note 8. 
17 GOOGLE EARTH, http://earth.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=21406 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2010).  The support section of Google Earth explains how Google Earth 
Pro utilizes higher resolution imagery, 4,800 pixels, as opposed to the 1,000 pixels utilized 
by the basic version of Google Earth; furthermore, the Pro version is faster, automatically 
geo-locates import images and designed for use by consultants and businesses by including 
site-wide installations.  Id. 
18 GOOGLE EARTH, http://earth.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=176172&cbid= 
3vu7gqxvryud&src=cb&lev=%20answer (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 
19 Id. 
20 Where to See Free Satellite Images, TOPBITS.COM,http://www.tech-faq.com/where-to-
see-free-satellite-images.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) (stating that this product does not 
have to be downloaded but ―can be directly used from the web browser‖). 
21 Google Milestones, supra note 13. 
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along public thoroughfares.22  This allows the user of Street View to 
see the image of a particular place as if they were standing on the 
street.  This application has created a lot of controversy and even 
sparked litigation, most notably the case Boring v. Google Inc.23  The 
Borings, a couple living in Pennsylvania, sued Google over its ―Street 
View‖ application claiming, among other things, invasion of priva-
cy.24  The court granted Google‘s motion to dismiss the Borings‘ in-
vasion of privacy claim.25  In defending the lawsuit, Google asserted 
that this imagery is no different from what one can observe by walk-
ing or driving down a street.26  It is important to note that this holding 
could have a direct effect on cases pertaining to imagery found on 
Google Maps or Google Earth.  While these applications do not de-
pict images that are readily observable from a roadway, they do, 
however, depict images that are readily observable from anyone with-
in publicly navigable airspace. 
B. Google Earth: Uses and Applications 
The availability and accessibility of programs that utilize sa-
tellite imagery has led to a burgeoning new market that has affected 
many industries.27  Users of Google Earth, both public and private, 
are finding and implementing this technology in new and creative 
ways.28  Law enforcement agencies have increasingly utilized satel-
 
22 Boring v. Google Inc., 362 F. App‘x 273, 276 (3d Cir. 2010). 
23 Id. at 273. 
24 Id. at 276 (―The Borings, who live on a private road in Pittsburgh, discovered that 
Google had taken ‗colored imagery of their residence . . . without obtaining any privacy 
waiver or authorization‘ . . . [and] assert[ed] claims for invasion of privacy, trespass, 
injunctive relief, negligence, and conversion.‖). 
25 Id. at 283. 
26 Id. at 276 (asserting that ―the scope of Street View is public roads‖) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
27 Craig, supra note 8, at 553 (―Some of the industries that can . . . benefit from Google 
Earth . . . include commercial real estate, residential real estate, architecture/engineering, 
insurance, media, defense/intelligence, homeland security, public sector, and state and local 
government.‖). 
28 See, e.g., Muhammed v. Martoccio, No. 3:06-cv-1137 (WWE), 2010 WL 3718560, at 
*3 (D. Conn. Sept. 13, 2010) (explaining how the court utilized Google Maps to determine 
the driving distance between attorney‘s offices for the purpose of figuring out fees for 
driving time); People v. Appice, No. A118369, 2009 WL 2634758, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 
27, 2009) (describing how an accident reconstruction expert utilized Google Earth to 
determine speed of impact of car at time of crash and the distances where the driver lost 
control); Egyptian Desert Expedition Confirms Spectacular Meteorite Impact, SCIENTIFIC 
COMPUTING, http://www.scientificcomputing.com/news-DS-Egyptian-Desert-Expedition-
5
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lite imaging in their enforcement of laws and apprehension of crimi-
nals.  It stands to reason that, with corporations and law enforcement 
agencies employing this technology, it was only a matter of time be-
fore municipalities and their departments would find uses for it as 
well.29 
Recently, there have been three notable examples of munici-
palities utilizing satellite imaging, namely Google Earth, to enforce 
their laws.  First, as an alternative to helicopters, officials in Greece 
were reportedly using satellite imagery to locate homes with undec-
lared pools as a means to find tax evaders.30  Second, code enforce-
ment officials in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina were said to 
be utilizing aerial images and services, such as Google Earth, to veri-
fy complaints concerning code violations.31  Third, the Town of Ri-
verhead was noted as using Google Earth to sweep the town for illeg-
al pools.32  Of these news stories, the use of satellite imaging by the 
Town of Riverhead seemed to generate the most controversy.  This is 
partly because the policy of Greek officials has no bearing on Ameri-
can citizens, as it is far from the confines of an American home and is 
not subject to the United States Constitution.  On the other hand, 
Mecklenburg County is located in the United States; however, its pol-
 
Confirms-Spectacular-Meteorite-Impact-092710.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) (stating that 
a mineralogist spotted a meteorite impact site while doing a Google Earth study); GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/enterprise/earthmaps/industries.html#utm_campaign=en&utm_sourc
e=earth-en-biz-gep-ind (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) (describing how Google Earth can be 
utilized by different businesses, including site surveying by engineering firms, urban 
planning and infrastructure maintenance by state and local entities, underwriting and claim 
management for insurance companies and overlay site plans by architecture firms). 
29 Frank Eltman, How Governments are Using Public Images to Spy on You, CHICAGO 
DAILY HERALD, Aug. 15, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 16362319 (―High tech eyes in the 
sky – from satellite imagery to sophisticated aerial photography that maps entire 
communities – are being employed in creative new ways by government officials, a trend 
that civil libertarians and others fear are eroding privacy rights.‖). 
30 Seth Weintraub, Greek Government using Google Maps to Find Tax Cheats with Pools, 
CNNMONEY.COM (Aug. 2, 2010), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2010/08/02/greek-government-
using-google-maps-to-find-tax-cheats-with-pools (utilizing Google Maps as a way to help 
solve their financial crisis because Greek citizens are hiding their assets).  Having a pool is a 
sign of wealth, and while only 324 pools were properly documented, the government found 
close to 17,000 pools in the suburbs.  Id. 
31 Russell Nichols, Google Earth Helps Identify Code Violators in Mecklenburg County, 
N.C., GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY (Sep. 2, 2010), http://www.govtech.com/e-
government/102484274.html (quoting a county code enforcement manager as saying ―[t]he 
majority of our complaints come in from neighbors complaining about somebody . . . [w]e 
just use the technology to prove or disprove what‘s going on in a particular location‖). 
32 Freedman & Van Sant, supra note 1. 
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icy did not spark controversy because officials in Mecklenburg only 
utilized Google Earth to ―verify‖ complaints, whereby Riverhead of-
ficials used it to sweep the entire town.33  A ―sweep‖ of all the citi-
zens has a different feel to it, a feeling of regulation and that ―big 
brother is watching,‖ which society is obviously not ready to accept. 
This is evidenced by the fact that after the Riverhead contro-
versy brought light to Mecklenburg County‘s policy, officials there 
were quick to point out that they do not ―snoop around randomly,‖ 
but use Google Earth to verify complaints from neighbors.34  In the 
case of Riverhead, a ―sweep‖ of the entire town was conducted utiliz-
ing Google Earth to locate homes with pools.35  These homes were 
then cross-referenced with the permits on file with the town to deter-
mine if they were conforming to the Town Code.36  Utilizing this 
technology, the town caught 250 homeowners who had swimming 
pools without ever filing the proper permits.37  Town officials de-
fended this practice on the basis that pool safety is a legitimate con-
cern.38  On the other hand, opponents of the practice have stated that 
the motive for the policy was financial.39  In reality, a reasonable per-
son can see that the policy effectuated both ends.  It made the viola-
tors comply with the town‘s safety standards while charging them 
fees for the proper permits.  Furthermore, a home with a pool will 
have higher real estate taxes, which is a residual monetary benefit to 
the town.  However, an argument can be made that the monetary ben-
efit is trivial when considering the estimated budget for the town in 
2011 was $88,637,642.00.40  Regardless, officials in surrounding mu-
nicipalities have taken note of this practice.41  While officers in 
―[l]arger communities, with more parcels and permits to check, ex-
press[] greater reluctance‖ and prefer to catch code violators the 
 
33 Compare Freedman & Van Sant, supra note 1, with Nichols, supra note 31. 
34 Nichols, supra note 31 (stating that ―[t]his is public information‖). 
35 Freedman & Van Sant, supra note 1. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. (stating that they only looked at pools ―because of safety concerns.  Without permits 
and the required inspections, pools can be hazards . . . because there‘s no way to tell whether 
. . . such pools meets code and state safety regulations‖). 
39 Id. (noting that Lillie Coney, an associate director of the Electronic Privacy Information 
Center, believes ―Google Earth . . . has become, like other satellite image services, a prying 
eye for cash-hungry local governments‖). 
40 TOWN OF RIVERHEAD, http://www.riverheadli.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) (click on 
Tentative Budget 2011 link; then go to Page E for the itemized budget). 
41 Freedman & Van Sant, supra note 1. 
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complaint driven way,42 others see it as a creative adaptation to the 
current policies.  Either way, ―[g]overnment officials claim anyone 
can use these tools, and aerial imaging helps detect violations and 
solve problems faster.‖43  Thus, the real debatable issue is not the mo-
tive of the policy, but the constitutionality of the practice. 
Many municipalities utilize some sort of aerial photography 
tool, typically GIS (geographic information system), that incorporates 
satellite imaging.44  These systems are generally used by the tax as-
sessor or planning department.45  These are departments within a mu-
nicipality which utilize satellite technology daily, albeit without the 
controversy attached to its use.  This is probably a result of the fact 
that these GIS programs are utilized for informational purposes and 
not for regulatory purposes.  It should be noted that these GIS pro-
grams cost thousands of dollars to implement and maintain.  In con-
trast, the basic version of Google Earth is a free web-based applica-
tion, available to anyone with a computer and an internet connection.  
Therefore, it does not appear that one can contend that utilizing 
Google Earth is in effect a misappropriation of tax dollars.  Hence, it 
must be the use of satellite imagery for regulatory purposes that does 
not appeal to society.  Therefore, when the code enforcement division 
of a municipality utilized satellite imagery, via a free service (Google 
Earth), it was inevitable that a debate about invasion of privacy and 




43 Nichols, supra note 31. 
44 See, e.g., Nassau County Land Records Viewer, NASSAU COUNTY, 
http://www.nassaucountyny.gov/mynassauproperty/main.jsp (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) 
(providing public records, including photos and satellite images, for properties located in 
Nassau County, New York); Town of Huntington Land Mgmt. Info., TOWN OF HUNTINGTON, 
http://tohgis.town.huntington.ny.us/landmenu.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) (providing a 
GIS system for the Town of Huntington located in Suffolk County, New York that depicts, 
among other things, satellite imagery of properties located within the town); Southampton 
Town Geographic Information Systems, TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON, 
http://www.southamptontownny.gov/content/760/762/2601/2725/798/1001/3070/default. 
aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) (providing a free service as well as a more advanced paid 
service to users, allowing access to a variety of GIS web mapping applications that contain 
detailed information and satellite imagery for properties located in the Town of 
Southampton, Suffolk County, New York). 
45 California GIS Map & Information Sites, COORDINATED LEGAL, 
http://www.coordinatedlegal.com/gis.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
8
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III. FOURTH AMENDMENT: KEEPING PACE WITH 
TECHNOLOGY 
Throughout the past century, the United States Supreme Court 
has had to grapple with the effects of the increase in technology, its 
use and its subsequent effect on the Fourth Amendment.  The Fourth 
Amendment guarantees ―[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons [and] houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated.‖46  However, with the advent of new and in-
creasingly more sophisticated technology, there was a shift in what is 
considered an unreasonable search and seizure.  Thus, throughout the 
years, the Supreme Court has had to determine the ―limits there are 
upon . . . technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.‖47  
Typically, the cases concerning this issue involved the use of tech-
nology by law enforcement. 
One of the earliest Supreme Court cases illustrating the ef-
fects of technology on the Fourth Amendment was Olmstead v. Unit-
ed States.48  Olmstead suggested ―that the Fourth Amendment‘s reach 
. . . ‗turn[ed] upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into 
any given enclosure.‘ ‖49  Olmstead was decided in 1928 and it was 
not until 1967 that the Court revisited this issue and determined that a 
physical trespass was not a required element to prove an invasion of 
privacy.50  In Katz v. United States,51 the Supreme Court overruled 
earlier precedent regarding technology and the Fourth Amendment 
when it discarded the physical intrusion approach in favor of the pri-
vacy interest approach.52  The writing was on the wall, as it was noted 
―that the meaning of [the] Fourth Amendment . . . must change to 
 
46 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
47 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (noting ―[f]or example . . . the 
technology enabling human flight has exposed to public view . . . uncovered portions of the 
house and its curtilage that once were private‖). 
48 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the wiretapping of a telephone line was not a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
49 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280 (1983) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 353 (1967)). 
50 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280 (overruling Olmstead by stating ―that the Fourth Amendment‘s 
reach ‗cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given 
enclosure‘ ‖) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 353). 
51 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
52 Id. at 352-53. 
9
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keep pace with the march of science.‖53 
Additionally, the Court set forth the two part test, still fol-
lowed today, for determining if there has been a Fourth Amendment 
violation.54  The first part is whether ―the individual has shown that 
‗he seeks to preserve something as private.‘ ‖55  The second part is 
whether ―the individual‘s expectation [of privacy], viewed objective-
ly, is justifiable under the circumstances.‖56  This two part test must 
be satisfied in the affirmative for an individual to have a meritorious 
cause of action for a Fourth Amendment invasion of privacy claim.  
However, with the advent of new technology and the multitude of 
scenarios that may arise from its use, the Katz test must be utilized in 
concert with other Supreme Court decisions and case law. 
At first glance, it would appear that a Riverhead citizen‘s 
claim of invasion of privacy against the municipality may have merit.  
For instance, if the citizen put up a fence, hedge row or arborvitaes 
hiding the view of his backyard, from public view, this could prove 
that he or she intended the pool area to be private, thus, satisfying 
Part I of the Katz test.57  Furthermore, a reasonable argument can be 
made that society, or an objective person, would regard the backyard, 
especially the pool area, as an area where one would have an expecta-
tion of privacy; thus, satisfying Part II of the Katz test.  However, the 
determination of the constitutionality of this policy would not simply 
begin and end with the Katz test.  Due to the existence of other rele-
vant and more recent case law, this test would be but one facet of the 
inquiry.  Furthermore, the claim would be against the Town of River-
head and its code enforcement division, which would add another 
dimension to the analysis. 
While the majority of case law focuses on ―law enforcement‖ 
 
53 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (commenting on the fact that 
this has been the credence of the Supreme Court ever since Katz v. United States). 
54 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280-81. 
55 Id. at 281 (alteration in original) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).  The Court pointed out 
that ―[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home . . . is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even 
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.‖  Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
56 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 353) (explaining that the second part 
of the test can also be understood as ―whether the individual‘s subjective expectation of 
privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable‖). 
57 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (holding that when dealing with the 
expectation of privacy, a court must look at if the one who is claiming a violation ―took 
normal precautions to maintain his privacy‖). 
10
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and the Fourth Amendment, there does not appear to be any reason 
why the letter of the law would be applied differently to other gov-
ernment agencies.  The code enforcement division is an integral part 
of local government and plays a significant part in ―protecting the 
health, safety and welfare of the community.‖58  Accordingly, this 
mantra is followed by the Town of Riverhead‘s code enforcement di-
vision.59  The Town‘s website states that ―Code Enforcement Offic-
er[s] . . . enforce the Town Code, Property Maintenance Code and 
Parking Regulations through measures and procedures that emphas-
ize compliance.‖60  The ultimate goal is the utilization of ―fair, con-
sistent and equitable enforcement measures while protecting the con-
stitutional rights of all Americans.‖61 
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit law enforcement 
―from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth 
with such enhancement as science and technology [can] afford[].‖62  
The problem arises when the advancement of technology has a signif-
icant impact on the application of a constitutional right.63  The Su-
preme Court has ―held that the application of the Fourth Amendment 
depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 
justifiable, a reasonable, or a legitimate expectation of privacy that 
has been invaded by government action.‖64 
In 2001, the Supreme Court decided Kyllo v. United States,65 
 
58 Harry M. Hipler, Special Magistrates in Code Enforcement Proceedings: Local 
Government Agents or Arbiters of Fairness and Justice?, 38 STETSON L. REV 519, 519, 539 
(2009) (―Code violations . . . can affect . . . neighborhoods‘ aesthetics, stability, and property 
value.  If code violations remain unchecked and uncorrected, a once-solid neighborhood can 
turn into vacant buildings and foreclosed properties.  If property values decline, there can be 
a drop in tax revenue and spending for schools, non-school services, and local 
development.‖). 
59 Code Enforcement, TOWN OF RIVERHEAD, http://www.riverheadli.com/code.html (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2010) (regarding the Code Enforcement Division, its purpose is to ―ensure[] 
public safety and promote[] the highest achievable quality of life for the Town of 
Riverhead‘s residents, business owners and tourists‖). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282. 
63 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33, 34 (―It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy 
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of 
technology.‖). 
64 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280 (internal citations omitted). 
65 533 U.S at 40 (holding that the use of sense enhancing technology to gather information 
regarding the interior of a home that could not have been obtained through visual 
surveillance constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
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in which the Court stated that ―[w]here . . . the Government uses a 
device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private 
home that‖ could not be obtained by visual surveillance, it constitutes 
a search.66  The implications of this statement, which ambiguously 
favors technology, leaves open the possibility of the Court revisiting 
the tension between technology and the right to privacy as surveil-
lance devices become more available.67  Furthermore, this open-
ended statement creates confusion as to what new devices could be 
utilized for surveillance purposes, as technology is ever increasing.  
Eight years ago, the satellite technology now accessible on the web 
was not available to the public; it was utilized by our military and in-
telligence agencies.  However, now it is in general public use, offered 
for free on the internet.  Therefore, shouldn‘t its use be deemed con-
stitutional?  For example, Riverhead utilized Google Earth, a device 
in general public use, to explore details of a private home (back-
yards).  Under Kyllo, it would appear that Riverhead‘s use of Google 
Earth would be constitutional.  However, this conclusion contradicts 
earlier Supreme Court case law. 
Riverhead‘s use of Google Earth to locate illegal pools would 
appear to be an invasion of privacy under the Katz standard, but not 
according to the Kyllo standard.  Therefore, the issue becomes which 
standard should govern.  In this instance, the Kyllo standard should 
govern because it is the more recent case law on Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Additionally, it is more analogous to the situation in 
Riverhead with regard to technology and privacy interests.  However, 
further inquiry is needed to determine how this policy comports with 
other recent case law and well-settled doctrines. 
In a recent Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case, the court 
acknowledged the ever-changing relationship between technology 
and the Fourth Amendment when it noted, ―[s]hould government 
someday decide to institute programs of mass surveillance . . . it will 
be time . . . to decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be in-
terpreted to treat such surveillance as a search.‖68  Would the policy 
by Riverhead Town utilizing Google Earth to ―sweep‖ the town for 
 
66 Id. at 27. 
67 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―[I]t seems likely that the threat to 
privacy will grow, rather than recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more 
readily available.‖). 
68 Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998 (stating, however, that currently ―[t]here is a tradeoff between 
security and privacy, and often it favors security‖). 
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss2/6
  
2012 SATELLITES & MUNICIPALITIES 433 
illegal pools constitute ―mass surveillance?‖  A definition for ―mass 
surveillance‖ was not given by the court; however, Black‘s Law Dic-
tionary defines surveillance as ―observation . . . of a person or place 
in the hope of gathering evidence.‖69  Thus, mass surveillance would 
be surveillance on a grand scale.  There is a plausible argument that 
Riverhead‘s policy would fall within the meaning of that term. 
Historically, the Supreme Court has had to redefine the scope 
of the Fourth Amendment to keep pace with technology.70  The Court 
switched from the physical intrusion approach in favor of the privacy 
approach.71  Furthermore, the Court has adopted standards, Kyllo and 
Katz, in order to determine whether a particular action is considered 
an unreasonable search and seizure.  However, with the growth of 
technology came an escalation of ambiguity as to what would be con-
sidered unconstitutional.  Is the use of satellite imaging by a govern-
mental agency to regulate its citizens constitutional?  The Supreme 
Court has yet to decide a case on point, so there is no governing 
precedent for lower courts to follow and as such it is open for debate.  
Nonetheless, if the surveillance is of a residence, one should consider 
the longstanding doctrines of open fields and curtilage. 
IV. PROTECTING THE CASTLE: OPEN FIELDS OR 
CURTILAGE 
It is well settled that the home warrants the utmost privacy 
and is protected under the Fourth Amendment.72  However, the home 
has been considered to go beyond the four walls of the actual dwel-
ling and include surrounding areas.73  Not all of these areas surround-
ing the home are considered protected for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses, but only those within the curtilage.74 
 
69 BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
70 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53 (discarding the physical intrusion approach and adopting 
the privacy approach). 
71 Id. 
72 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (recognizing that the Framers 
intended that the sanctity of the home ―be free from arbitrary government interference‖). 
73 Id. at 180 (noting that the curtilage ―has been considered part of home itself for Fourth 
Amendment purposes‖). 
74 Id. (reaffirming that ―no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields‖). 
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A. Curtilage 
Curtilage is defined as ―[t]he land or yard adjoining a house, 
usu[ally] within an enclosure.‖75  This is a broad definition, as the 
―land or yard adjoining the house‖ can be construed vaguely and can 
include large swathes of land.  The Supreme Court stated that ―[a]t 
common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate 
activity associated with the ‗sanctity of a man‘s home and the priva-
cies of life.‘ ‖76  The scope of curtilage has been refined but it is still 
the same in principle.  Today, curtilage is considered ―an area of do-
mestic use immediately surrounding a dwelling and usually but not 
always fenced in with the dwelling.‖77 
In an effort to clear up any ambiguities with regard to the 
scope of curtilage, the Court in United States v. Dunn78 laid out a four 
part analysis.79  In determining whether a particular search took place 
within the curtilage, a court must analyze: 
(1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to 
the home; (2) whether the area is included within an 
enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature of the 
uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken 
by the resident to protect the area from observation by 
people passing by.80 
The analysis starts with the first prong which is the proximity 
test.81  With regard to swimming pools, these are typically proximate 
to a house.  However, at what distance is an improvement considered 
proximate?  Would a shed, detached garage or barn be considered 
proximate?  In certain circumstances it has been held that a barn, 
physically separate from the house, does not enjoy Fourth Amend-
ment protection because it is not within the curtilage of the home.82  
 
75 BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  Further defining curtilage, as it pertains to 
the Fourth Amendment, as ―an area usu[ally] protected from warrantless searches.‖  Id. 
76 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
77 United States v. LaBerge, 267 F. Supp. 686, 692 (D. Md. 1967). 
78 480 U.S. 294 (1987). 
79 Id. at 301. 
80 United States v. Pace, 955 F.2d 270, 274 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Dunn, 480 U.S. at 
301). 
81 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301. 
82 Pace, 955 F.2d at 272. 
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This is because it did not pass the other prongs of the analysis.83  As 
such, there are exceptions to the proximity factor, as each factor in 
the analysis must be considered. 
The second prong of the analysis is ―whether the area is in-
cluded within an enclosure surrounding the home.‖84  As noted by the 
Supreme Court, ―for most homes, the boundaries of the curtilage will 
be clearly marked; and the conception defining the cartilage—as the 
area around the home to which the activity of home life extends—is a 
familiar one easily understood from our daily experience.‖85  One ex-
ample of such a boundary is a fence.  A fence is considered signifi-
cant ―as . . . fences generally ‗serve[] to demark a specific area of 
land immediately adjacent to the house that is readily identifiable as 
part and parcel of the house.‘ ‖86  This prong can correlate and some-
times overlap the fourth prong of the analysis.  Examples of this 
would be the erection of a fence or installation of a natural hedge 
row.  These features will tend to demarcate an area one would con-
sider within the curtilage as well as protect the area from the observa-
tion of people walking by. 
The third prong hinges on the ―nature of the uses to which the 
area is put.‖87  Typically, these uses include ―intimate activit[ies] as-
sociated with the sanctity of a man‘s home and privacies of life.‖88  It 
would appear reasonable to say that the use of a swimming pool 
would fall within the intimate activities category.  Families tend to 
spend a lot of time around their swimming pools, especially in the 
summer months, to which a reasonable person would expect privacy.  
The swimming pool is an amenity utilized for many activities such as 
swimming, sun bathing, relaxing and socializing with friends and 
family.  These activities as well as other legal activities that occur 
within the curtilage should enjoy the protection of the doctrine.  On 
the other hand, if an area is utilized for illegal activities, then one 
cannot presume to be protected by the doctrine of curtilage.89  There-
 
83 Id. at 274 (explaining that in Pace, ―the officers had evidence that the barn was not 
being used in connection with the ‗intimacies of the home,‘ ‖ but rather it was being used for 
illegal purposes). 
84 Id. at 274 n.2 (quoting Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301). 
85 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12). 
86 Pace, 955 F.2d at 275 (alteration in original) (quoting Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302). 
87 Id. at 274 n.2 (quoting Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301). 
88 Id. at 275 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
89 Id. at 275-76. 
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fore, if having an illegal pool constitutes an illegal activity under this 
principle, then the violator would have no recourse. 
The fourth prong analyzes ―the steps taken by the resident to 
protect the area from observation by people passing by.‖90  As men-
tioned previously, this prong can work in concert with the second 
prong of the analysis such that some courts utilize three elements by 
combining the second and fourth elements.  Typically, satisfying the 
fourth prong will satisfy the second prong.  The steps taken by resi-
dents to protect the area from observation from people passing by in-
clude erecting fences and installing hedges, bushes and trees which, 
in addition, typically delineate an area considered intimately asso-
ciated with the home.  There is an implied intent to maintain privacy 
when such steps are taken.  However, the problem with this prong is 
that it is vague in its meaning of who constitutes a passerby.  There is 
no elaboration between whether this embodies all passersby or just 
ones at street level. 
The Court pointed out that these factors are not a strict guide-
line but yet an ―analytical tool[]‖ to help determine ―whether the area 
in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be 
placed under the home‘s ‗umbrella‘ of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.‖91  It is noted that ―[t]he extent of the curtilage to which the 
Fourth Amendment protection attaches is not unlimited[,]‖ and that 
the boundaries are determined ―by ‗factors that bear upon whether an 
individual reasonably may expect that the area in question should be 
treated as the home itself.‘ ‖92  However, the main consideration in 
these cases concerns ―whether the area harbors the intimate activity 
associated with the sanctity of a man‘s home and privacies of life.‖93 
Accordingly, it appears that, at the very least, a swimming 
pool would be considered to fall within the area known as curtilage 
and be afforded Fourth Amendment protection.94  However, there are 
holes in the Dunn analysis.  As previously discussed, it is not specifi-
cally mentioned whether the fourth prong of the analysis applies to 
observation from publicly navigable airspace.  Therefore, this doc-
 
90 Id. at 274 n.2 (quoting Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301). 
91 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301. 
92 Pace, 955 F.2d at 275 (quoting Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300). 
93 Id. (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
94 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300 (―[T]he Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage of a house and 
. . . the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably 
may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself.‖). 
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trine cannot be utilized in a vacuum.  In addition to the Dunn test, 
there is other case law and doctrines that apply and need to be consi-
dered. 
Furthermore, the doctrine of curtilage is limited in scope as 
not all areas of one‘s property fall within its protection.  Property that 
falls outside the curtilage may be subject to the open fields doctrine.  
The Court has shown that ―government[] intrusion upon the open 
fields is not one of those ‗unreasonable‘ searches proscribed by the 
text of the Fourth Amendment.‖95  The doctrine of curtilage typically 
cannot be invoked when the ―open fields‖ or ―plain view‖ doctrines 
are in play. 
B. Open Fields 
The open fields doctrine is a ―rule [that] permit[s] a warrant-
less search of the area outside a property owner‘s curtilage.‖96  The 
Supreme Court first articulated this doctrine in Hester v. United 
States.97  In Hester, the Court stated that ―the special protection ac-
corded by the Fourth Amendment to the people . . . is not extended to 
the open fields.‖98  The distinction between ―open fields‖ and the cur-
tilage of the home was laid out in Oliver v. United States,99 where the 
Court stated that ―[o]pen fields are [not] protected [ ] under the text 
of the Fourth Amendment . . . [because it] protect[s only] those areas 
in which individuals have a ‗reasonable expectation of privacy.‘ ‖100  
In essence, open fields are considered to be outside the realm of pri-
vacy, in areas in which a reasonable person would not expect to have 
privacy.  These ―open fields‖ may or may not be within the public 
view. 
On the other hand, ―[t]he curtilage of the home . . . was dis-
tinguished from open fields in the common law, a distinction the 
Court in Oliver took to mean that ‗only the curtilage, not the neigh-
boring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that 
attach to the home.‘ ‖101  This is premised on the fact that ―open 
 
95 Id. at 303-04 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177). 
96 BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
97 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
98 Id. 
99 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
100 Pace, 955 F.2d at 274-75 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176 n.6). 
101 Id. at 275 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180). 
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fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the 
Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or 
surveillance.‖102 
Furthermore, ―the rule of Hester v. United States . . . may be 
understood as providing that an individual may not legitimately de-
mand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in 
the area immediately surrounding the home.‖103  Accordingly, there is 
―no constitutional difference between [ ] observations conducted 
while in a public place and while standing in the open fields.‖104  Fol-
lowing this methodology, there would be no constitutional infringe-
ment when satellite technology is utilized to search ―open fields,‖ as 
they are afforded less protection than that of the area constituting cur-
tilage. 
In conclusion, if the area subject to surveillance is located in 
―open fields‖ then no privacy interest exists.  On the other hand, if 
the area is located in the ―curtilage‖ then a privacy interest does exist.  
Therefore, some areas of an improved parcel would be given greater 
protection depending on whether it constitutes open fields or curti-
lage.  In general, the pool area would appear to be within the curti-
lage of a home, thereby, warranting a heightened sense of privacy.  
However, with regard to curtilage, there is no hard and fast rule that 
applies to observation of the curtilage from publicly navigable air-
space which is what one can observe utilizing Google Earth.  There-
fore, it appears that the doctrine of curtilage has limitations with re-
gard to the matter at hand. 
C. Recent Case Law – Dow Chemical Company & 
Ciraolo 
The Supreme Court in two recent cases, Dow Chemical Com-
pany v. United States and California v. Ciraolo, decided on the same 
day, tackled the issues regarding advanced methods of surveillance, 
 
102 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179. 
103 Id. at 178; see, e.g., Air Pollution Variance Bd. of the State of Colorado v. Western 
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974) (finding that a field inspector who made 
observations and took readings of the smoke emanating from a building‘s smoke stacks was 
not a violation of the company‘s Fourth Amendment rights; the Court ―refused to extend the 
Fourth Amendment to sights seen in the open fields,‖ noting that anyone in the city could see 
the same thing). 
104 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304. 
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particularly aerial photography, and their relationship to the Fourth 
Amendment.105 
1. Dow Chemical Company v. United States 
Dow Chemical operated a facility that manufactured chemi-
cals and, as a result, was subject to inspections by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).106  The EPA requested such an inspection 
of the facility, which encompassed approximately 2,000 acres, and 
Dow Chemical denied the request.107  Subsequently, the EPA hired a 
commercial aerial photographer to fly over the facility and take aerial 
pictures.108  The photographer utilized a standard aerial mapping 
camera to take pictures from as close as 1,200 feet above the facility, 
in publicly navigable airspace.109  Dow Chemical brought suit ―con-
ten[ding] that taking aerial photographs constituted a search without a 
warrant, thereby violating [their] rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment.‖110  The Court held that Dow Chemical‘s Fourth Amendment 
rights were not violated.111  It was reasoned that ―[a]ny person with 
an airplane and an aerial camera‖ could have conducted similar sur-
veillance.112  Applying this to the current problem, there would be no 
violation of the Fourth Amendment because the same surveillance 
that a municipality was using on its citizens could be conducted by 
any person with a computer and the internet. 
Dow Chemical claimed that it had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and that the prongs of the Oliver test were satisfied, as evi-
denced by the existence of fencing and security details that made 
 
105 See Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 229 (granting certiorari to hear a case concerning 
aerial photography without a warrant of a commercial property and its relationship with the 
Fourth Amendment); Ciraolo I, 476 U.S. at 209 (granting certiorari to hear a case 
concerning aerial photography of a residential property without a warrant and its relationship 
with the Fourth Amendment). 




110 Id. at 234. 
111 Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 239 (―[T]he taking of aerial photographs of an industrial 
plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth 
Amendment.‖). 
112 Id. at 231. 
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ground level observation of the premises obsolete.113  However, the 
Court‘s rebuttal was that they did not take any precautions against 
aerial intrusion.  Some might argue that this is an unreasonable con-
tention because preventing aerial intrusion, especially when this in-
trusion takes place in public airspace, would be difficult.  For proper-
ty owners who would want to shield their curtilage, such as a 
backyard or pool area, they would have to install some sort of cover-
ing.  First, this could prove to be a financial burden.  Second, there 
could be an aesthetic issue that accompanies such structures.  Finally, 
permanent structures would have to be approved by the building de-
partment of the local municipality,114 so in essence the municipality 
would still be the final decision maker in a citizen‘s effort to maintain 
privacy. 
Dow Chemical claimed that the EPA lacked the authority to 
utilize tools such as aerial photography for site inspections.115  How-
ever, the Court disagreed, stating that ―[r]egulatory or enforcement 
authority generally carries with it all the modes of inquiry and inves-
tigation traditionally employed or useful to execute the authority 
granted.‖116  Additionally, the Court made it a point to mention that 
―[t]he Government [was] seeking these photographs in order to regu-
late . . . Dow.‖117  Similarly, a municipality‘s code enforcement de-
partment would utilize satellite technology to regulate the codes of 
their respective municipality. 
The Court added a side note to its holding, possibly realizing 
that the next step past aerial photography would be satellite imaging.  
The Court stated ―[i]t may well be, as the Government concedes, that 
surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveil-
lance equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite 
technology, might be constitutionally proscribed, absent a war-
 
113 Id. at 229 (stating that Dow, in addition to elaborate ground level security, investigates 
any low level aircraft that fly over the complex). 
114 See, e.g., Washington Commons, LLC v. City of Jersey City, 7 A.3d 225, 228 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (stating that New Jersey‘s municipal law allows governing 
municipal bodies the discretion to oversee and require permits for construction of structures 
and may even pursue action to frustrate construction of structures not in compliance with 
their local laws). 
115 Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 230 (alleging that the EPA‘s use of aerial photography 
was not only a violation of the Fourth Amendment but beyond its investigative authority). 
116 Id. at 233. 
117 Id. at 232. 
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rant.‖118  Thus, in 1986, one could have contended, based on this dic-
ta, that warrantless satellite surveillance constituted an unconstitu-
tional search.  However, it should be noted that when this case was 
settled, satellite technology was not available to the public and was 
used primarily by the military and intelligence agencies.  Currently, 
satellite technology is easily accessible by the public, therefore, ap-
plying the holding from Dow Chemical, the use of it by a regulatory 
agency could be construed as constitutional. 
A significant attribute of the Dow Chemical case is the fact 
that it involves a commercial property as opposed to a residential 
property.  In Dow Chemical, it is reasoned that commercial property 
is afforded less protection than a private house.119  Furthermore, regu-
lation of a commercial property is afforded ―greater latitude‖ with re-
gard to searches.120  This ―reflects the fact that the expectation of pri-
vacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys . . . differs 
significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual‘s home.‖121  
Thus, it follows that if the Court were to find that satellite surveil-
lance of a commercial property was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, then satellite surveillance of a residential property 
would also be unconstitutional.  However, the Court found in this 
case that aerial photography of a commercial property was not a vi-
olation of the Fourth Amendment.122  Therefore, as it applies to 
commercial properties, it would appear that satellite surveillance of 
these properties within a municipality‘s jurisdiction does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. 
2. California v. Ciraolo 
The other case, decided on the same day as Dow Chemical, 
was California v. Ciraolo.123  This case involved aerial observation, 
similar to the aforementioned case, with the major difference being 
 
118 Id. at 238. 
119 Id. (―[U]nlike a homeowner‘s interest in his dwelling, ‗the interest of the owner of 
commercial property is not one in being free from any inspections.‘ ‖ (quoting Donovan v. 
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 (1981))) 
120 Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 237 (pointing out ―that the Government has ‗greater 
latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property‘ ‖ (Dewey, 452 U.S. at 
598)). 
121 Dewey, 452 U.S. at 598-99. 
122 Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 239. 
123 Ciraolo I, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
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that it involved observation of a residential dwelling as opposed to a 
commercial property.124  The issue in Ciraolo was ―whether the 
Fourth Amendment [was] violated by aerial observation without a 
warrant from an altitude of 1,000 feet of a fenced-in backyard within 
the curtilage of a home.‖125  The Supreme Court, reversing the Court 
of Appeals, held that warrantless aerial observation of a home did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.126  The Court of Appeals based its 
decision on the fact that the backyard was within the curtilage and 
that the ―fence[] constituted ‗objective criteria from which we may 
conclude . . . manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy by any 
standard.‘ ‖127  Overruling this basis, the Supreme Court made the 
distinction that the fence did not shield the backyard from some ob-
servations, but that ―[i]t can reasonably be assumed that the . . . fence 
was placed to conceal the [backyard] from at least street level views‖ 
and it served this purpose as far as ground level traffic was con-
cerned.128  Furthermore, it is held ―[t]hat [just because] the area is 
within the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation.‖129 
In Ciraolo, the police had a reasonable belief that the defen-
dant was growing marijuana in his fenced in backyard.130  As a result 
of the view restricting nature of the fence, the police flew a plane, 
within navigable airspace, over the backyard in question to perform 
aerial observation.131  A warrant was then issued based upon photo-
graphs taken during the aerial observation.132  Defense argued that 
this warrant was based on an illegal search and as such was invalid, 
 
124 Compare Ciraolo I, 476 U.S. at 209, with Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 229. 
125 Ciraolo I, 476 U.S. at 209. 
126 Id. at 210.  The California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court‘s denial of 
respondent‘s motion to suppress the evidence of the search and held that the warrantless 
aerial observation of his home violated the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
127 Id. (quoting People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1089 (1st Dist., Div. 5 1984) 
[hereinafter Ciraolo II]). 
128 Id. at 211. 
129 Ciraolo I, 476 U.S. at 213. 
130 Id. at 209.  The local police received a tip that respondent was growing marijuana in 
his backyard and upon investigating the tip they went to the property but were unable to 
observe the backyard because it was enclosed with two fences.  Id. 
131 Id.  The plane was commissioned by the officer assigned to the case who subsequently 
observed the respondent‘s backyard from the plane at an altitude of 1,000 feet, which is 
within navigable airspace.  Id. 
132 Ciraolo I, 476 U.S. at 209.  The police used a 35mm camera to photograph the 
backyard in question and were able to obtain a search warrant in part due to the photographs 
taken during the flyover.  Ciraolo I, 476 U.S. at 209. 
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rendering all the evidence inadmissible.133 
The Court of Appeals made it a point to mention ―that the 
flyover ‗was not the result of a routine patrol conducted for any other 
legitimate law enforcement or public safety objective, but was under-
taken for the specific purpose of observing this particular enclosure 
within . . . curtilage.‘ ‖134  This statement tends to show that the Court 
of Appeals would have found the aerial observation constitutional if 
it was routine and conducted for a public safety objective.  Thus, 
while the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court had a difference 
of opinion with regard to this case, it appears from their opinions that 
they would have agreed that it is not a constitutional violation for a 
municipality to routinely utilize a form of aerial photography for the 
furtherance of a public safety objective. 
V. MUNICIPALITY: CASE STUDY AND THEORY OF 
LIABILITY 
A municipality is defined as ―a primarily urban political unit 
having corporate status and usually powers of self-government.‖135  
In essence, a municipality is government on a small, localized 
scale.136  When news broke of a municipality utilizing Google Earth 
to look for code violations within its jurisdiction, people not only in 
that specific municipality were outraged, but individuals from around 
the nation voiced their concerns.  The fervor could be traced to the 
fact that if one municipality could implement such a policy, then oth-
ers may follow.  Moreover, what would stop the United States Gov-
ernment from utilizing a similar policy?  That is assuming it does not 
employ similar policies already.  The difference here is the scope of 
the inquiry.  While United States citizens can take solace in the fact 
that the government probably will not perform an ―aerial sweep‖ of 
all the homes within its borders, a municipality may and, as history 
dictates, has. 
 
133 Id. at 210, 212. 
134 Id. at 210 (quoting Ciraolo II, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 1089). 
135 MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
municipality (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
136 Jericho Water Dist. v. One Call Users Council, Inc., 887 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (N.Y. 
2008) (noting that a municipality ―denotes a unit of local government‖ and when construed 
narrowly can ―include only entities exercising general governmental functions-i.e., counties, 
cities, towns and villages‖). 
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A. Municipal Inspections 
In the past, the Supreme Court has found in favor of allowing 
municipal inspections on the basis that there was no infringement of 
an individual‘s Fourth Amendment rights.137  In one case, the Court 
based its decision on the fact that the ―routine inspection of the phys-
ical condition of private property is a less hostile intrusion than the 
typical policeman‘s search for the fruits and instrumentalities of 
crime.‖138  In another case, the majority held that ―municipal . . . 
housing inspection programs ‗touch at most upon the periphery of the 
important interests safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment‘s protec-
tion against official intrusion‘ because the inspections are merely to 
determine whether physical conditions exist which do not comply 
with minimum standards prescribed in local regulatory ordin-
ances.‖139  However, recently the Court has changed its position.140  
In Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francis-
co,141 the Court held ―that administrative searches . . . are significant 
intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.‖142  
Furthermore, the Court noted that it cannot be stated that these ad-
ministrative searches are less intrusive than, for example, a police 
search because in many cases a discovery of a code violation may 
lead to a criminal complaint.143 
Current case law dictates that the Supreme Court has sided 
with the ―privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary inva-
sions by governmental officials,‖ especially in one‘s home.144  How-
ever, it should be noted that this line of case law involves a munici-
 
137 Camara v. Mun. Court of the City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 525 
(1967) (citing Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367, 373 (1959)) (stating that in Frank, 
―this Court upheld . . . a state court conviction of a homeowner who refused to permit a 
municipal health inspector to enter and inspect his premises without a search warrant‖). 
138 Id. at 530. 
139 Id. (quoting Frank, 359 U.S. at 367). 
140 Id. at 530-31 (―We may agree that a routine inspection . . . is a less hostile intrusion 
than the typical policeman‘s search . . . [b]ut we cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment 
interests at stake in these inspection cases are merely peripheral.‖). 
141 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
142 Id. at 534.  ―[W]e hold that administrative searches . . . when authorized and conducted 
without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment 
guarantees to the individual.‖  Id. 
143 Camara, 387 U.S. at 531 (―Even in cities where discovery of a violation produces only 
an administrative compliance order, refusal to comply is a criminal offense . . . [and] refusal 
to permit an inspection is itself a crime. . . .‖). 
144 Id. at 528. 
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pality‘s physical intrusion upon an individual‘s dwelling and is not 
analogous to the mere observation of the ―curtilage‖ of one‘s home 
from a public viewpoint, namely aerial imagery that could be viewed 
from public navigable airspace.  Furthermore, instead of a building 
inspector physically intruding upon one‘s property, the inspectors 
could use the less intrusive satellite imaging to achieve the same 
ends. 
B. Case Study – Riverhead 
The municipality which started this controversy is the Town 
of Riverhead (―the Town‖), located on Long Island, in Suffolk Coun-
ty, in the State of New York.  According to a 2008 American Com-
munity Survey, there were 14,604 housing units in Riverhead.145  
However, it took only one town employee and the program known as 
Google Earth to search the entire township for illegal pools.146  In-
itially, before the media attention, this practice did not seem to be an 
issue.  However, after news broke about this program of surveillance, 
the Town stated ―many residents, together with local and regional 
community groups, have expressed their objection to and fear of 
eroding privacy rights by the Town of Riverhead Building Dept. use 
of virtual globe map and geographic information programs.‖147 
On September 8, 2010, within weeks of the story making na-
tional headlines, the Town passed a resolution ―restricting the use of 
virtual globe map and geographic information programs.‖148  Fur-
thermore, this resolution implemented a policy that ―restrict[ed the] 
use of satellite imagery as the basis or foundation of prosecutions in 
areas not readily observable from public locations and restricting use 
of satellite imagery to conduct ‗sweeps‘ in place of field inspections 
and investigations without [the] approval of the Town Board.‖149 
 
145 American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.factfinder.census.gov/ 
servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_event=Search&_name=riverhead&_state=04000US36&_county=ri
verhead&_cityTown=riverhead&_zip=&_sse=on&_lang=en&pctxt=fph&_submenuId=facts
heet_1 (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
146 Freedman & Van Sant, supra note 1. 
147 Riverhead, N.Y., Res. 709 (2010), available at http://www.riverheadli.com/ 
TBM.09.08.10.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
148 Id. (adopting, by a 5-0 vote, a policy titled ―Policy Regarding Use of Virtual Globe 
Map and Geographic Information to Initiate or Commence Prosecution for Violation of the 
Provisions of the Town Code of the Town of Riverhead by Town Departments‖). 
149 Id. 
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However, the Town did state that it ―recognize[d] the need to 
balance the Town‘s right to use satellite imagery, particularly in areas 
of public view . . . for which individuals do not have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy under the Town‘s police powers with a resident‘s 
right and expectation of privacy in their homes or areas not readily 
observable from a public location.‖150 
According to recent case law, the use of satellite imaging by a 
municipality to regulate its citizens would be constitutional.  River-
head utilized this method of surveillance, citing safety concerns, to 
search for the existence of illegal pools but due to public scrutiny de-
cided to discontinue this practice.  Looking for pools that are non-
compliant in order to bring them into compliance to reduce the possi-
ble risk of injury or death appears to be a plausible public safety ob-
jective.  Thus, this policy should pass constitutional muster, nonethe-
less, the Town discontinued this practice.  Additionally, a 
conceivable argument can be made that since this tool is available, a 
municipality should use it.  However, by not using this tool does a 
municipality subject themselves to liability?  The code enforcement 
and building divisions in a municipality are typically responsible for 
safeguarding its citizens.  Therefore, if a person is injured in, for ex-
ample, an illegal pool and the municipality failed to use all available 
tools to locate the pool and make it compliant, could it be possible to 
bring a claim of liability against the municipality? 
C. Municipal Liability 
―A municipality is a governmental entity entitled to sovereign 
immunity, but only for some of its functions.‖151  This section mainly 
relates to the functions of the enforcement divisions of a municipali-
ty, namely the building and code enforcement departments.  As socie-
ty progresses and the powers exerted by municipalities increase, so 
do the number of cases brought against municipalities for their roles 
in safeguarding the public.152  In addition, more and more courts are 
 
150 Id. 
151 Texas Bay Cherry Hill, L.P. v. City of Fort Worth, 257 S.W.3d 379, 388 (Tex. App. 
2008). 
152 Deborah L. Markowitz, Esq., Municipal Liability for Negligent Inspection and Failure 
to Enforce Safety Codes, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL‘Y 181, 182 (Spring 1994) (―Since the 
late 1970‘s, there have been numerous examples of municipalities that, having undertaken to 
conduct inspections, are charged for their negligence in failing to uncover violations.‖). 
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hearing these cases instead of dismissing them at the outset. 
In a recent New York case, the court denied the State‘s mo-
tion for summary judgment, dismissing the claim concerning damag-
es for common law negligence.153  In this case, New York State con-
ducted investigations of a property which included taking aerial 
photographs.154  Subsequently, the claimant was injured and brought 
suit against the state for failure to perform a reasonable investiga-
tion.155  In the opinion, the court referred to the responsibility of the 
municipality to perform a ―reasonable investigation‖ and ―diligent in-
spection.‖156  In another case, a municipality was ―found liable for 
both compensatory and punitive damages for its failure to inspect . . . 
and its consequent failure to enforce the [] code.‖157  Based on these 
decisions, it seems that a municipality could be held liable for not 
performing reasonable, diligent inspections.  Can a case be made by a 
parent of a child who drowns in a neighbor‘s pool, a pool that is not 
up to code, on the premise that the Town did not perform their due 
diligence in finding that this pool existed, thus requiring it to comply 
with the code?  This scenario is not a stretch of reality by any means.  
As evidenced above, it could be argued that a municipality was neg-
ligent for failing to perform a reasonable investigation.  Furthermore, 
an objective person would tend to assume a ―reasonable investiga-
tion‖ would have included all the tools at their disposal, including 
Google Earth.  Moreover, in Riverhead‘s case, their liability is heigh-
tened because they have already opened the door to utilizing Google 
Earth, notwithstanding the fact that they have since adopted a resolu-
tion to cease use of this application. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Satellite imagery, once an application only available to and 
utilized by military and intelligence agencies, has become main-
stream and available free to the public via multiple web-based servic-
 
153 Wynne v. New York, 863 N.Y.S.2d 222, 224 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2008). 
154 Id. at 657 (―Prior to the commencement of the construction, the State conducted 
investigations of the property to determine if the property was suitable to construct the exit 
ramp, which consisted of . . . taking aerial photographs.‖). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 658 (―[T]he claimant raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the State 
performed a reasonable investigation of the property . . . [and] that a diligent inspection 
would have disclosed the tank that caused the . . . injury.‖). 
157 Markowitz, supra note 142. 
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es such as Google Earth.  The transition from private to public use 
brought with it a surge in new and creative ways to utilize and im-
plement this technology in multiple arenas.  Law enforcement agen-
cies have been utilizing satellite imaging in furtherance of their du-
ties, including the regulation of crime.  It was only a matter of time 
before municipalities and their respective departments started using 
satellite imaging to regulate their citizens.  This latest trend, as exhi-
bited by the Town of Riverhead, has created a national controversy.  
Many people feel that their privacy rights are being eroded.  Civil li-
bertarians are left wondering at what point technology infringes on 
our Fourth Amendment rights.  Currently, there is no answer to this 
question.  The Supreme Court has yet to decide a case on point with 
regard to this issue. 
Throughout the years, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has 
evolved to keep pace with technology.  As technology progressed 
throughout the 20th century, the Court switched from a physical in-
trusion approach to a privacy interest approach.  However, it appears 
that technology, for the time being, has outpaced case law.  The stan-
dards set forth in Katz for determining if a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion has occurred could be construed as antiquated in today‘s tech-
nologically savvy society.  The Court in Kyllo acknowledged the fact 
that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence needs to carefully adapt to the 
changing times. 
The most analogous Supreme Court cases regarding the con-
stitutionality of the use of satellite imagery by a municipality for reg-
ulatory purposes are Dow Chemical Company v. United States and 
California v. Ciraolo.  These cases tackled the issues regarding ad-
vanced methods of surveillance, particularly aerial photography, and 
its relationship with the Fourth Amendment.  In Dow Chemical, the 
Court held that aerial surveillance of a commercial property did not 
violate the property owner‘s constitutional rights.158  Furthermore, in 
Ciraolo, the Court held that the warrantless aerial observation of the 
curtilage of a residence did not violate the Fourth Amendment.159  
Thus, applying the respective holdings of these cases to the current 
issue, it would be constitutional for a municipality to utilize satellite 
imagery to regulate its citizens. 
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge the doctrine of 
 
158 Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 239. 
159 Ciraolo I, 476 U.S. at 215. 
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curtilage.  It is arguable that most backyards, especially the pool area, 
would be considered within the curtilage of the home and afforded 
Fourth Amendment protection.  However, these areas are generally 
visible from publicly navigable airspace and, as such, would not be 
constitutionally protected from aerial surveillance, including satellite 
imaging.  Thus, the majority of recent case law shows that surveil-
lance accomplished by satellite imagery, even within a house‘s curti-
lage, is constitutional. 
Despite the fact that the present use of Google Earth by a mu-
nicipality to regulate its citizens may not be a popular policy, it is not 
a violation of a constitutional right.  However, the Supreme Court 
should address this issue because it is a slippery slope and has be-
come an area of concern.  As technology increases, many more ex-
amples regarding municipalities employing satellite based technology 
will arise, which in turn, will spark more debates about invasion of 
privacy.  A decision on point would obviate such debates and alle-
viate concerns by municipalities using satellite based technology.  
Furthermore, it will allow municipalities to utilize tools at their dis-
posal, bringing them in line with the Twenty-First century and at the 
same time making government more efficient. 
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